Source: Paul Grimblot, Letters of William III. And Louis XIV. and of their Ministers; Illustrative of the Domestic and Foreign Politics of England from the Peace of Ryswick to the Accession of Phillip V. of Spain: 1697 to 1700 (London, 1848). Text entered by Anthony Perry.
London, May 29. 1698
I BELIEVE that it will be
for the service of your Majesty that I have the honour to speak to you
thoroughly in this conjecture, of the knowledge which I have been able
to acquire of the means which England would have to carry on war, if an
occasion should arise which should appear so important to the nation that
it would believe itself obliged to recommence one.
I have already had
the honour to explain to your Majesty the condition in which it was.
Since that time the Parliament has granted three shillings in the pound
on the revenue of all lands for this year: it has granted a levy
of the poll tax, a duty on coals; the salt tax has been doubled; duties
have been imposed on tea, coffee, &c.: they cannot without laying
a duty on malt; and all this will not suffice, if the proposal which has
been made to establish a new East Indian Company does not succeed, which
offers two millions sterling, on condition that interest shall be paid
at 8 per cent., the principal of which cannot be repaid in less than twelve
years, and that their loan shall carry on the trade with the Indies; that
is to say, that no other party shall be interested in it. Of this
sum 700,000l. will be assigned to the King for the civil list of this year.
It was believed, also, that the excise will not be secured to him for his
whole life; but as it will not be free for a year and a half, and as it
is worth only 400,000l. the question is to have a fund for the 300,000l.
remaining and to provide for the present.
It is important for
this prince to make an arrangement with the Parliament which is assembled,
for it is believed that the next will not be so favourable, though the
present is less so than he could desire.
The money which had
been granted for the payment of the troops, which it was resolved to keep
up, is consumed. More will be asked for, because the reduction could
not be complete under the pretext for want of funds to pay them off.
The affair of the
grants has been deferred till the 6th, and notwithstanding all this, it
is almost certain that it will not pass. Thus, if the establishment
of the New East Indian Company should fail, no person would see any means
of terminating this session but by paying the interest of twenty millions,
and leaving it till next Parliament to pay the principal.
Such is certainly
the present state of affairs: but though this state is very extreme,
yet I am assured by very enlightened persons that the tax of three shillings
in the pound on land may be continued from year to year, and even raised
to four, as during the last war, which in that case would really produce
twelve or thirteen millions of our money. The poll tax might be continued,
which is worth six or seven. Part of the sums which are due might
be paid, and the sums destined for the repayment might be employed for
those other purposes. Duties might also be imposed on the importations
into London; but notwithstanding all the past distress, they always avoided
having recourse to this article.
It remains to be examined
how much coin is believed to be at present in England, that we may be able
to judge when it shall be necessary to have recourse to new expedients
to draw it from the country, if there would be any proportion between what
would be wanted annually, and the amount of ready money. It is calculated
that there are nearly eight millions in silver.
Nothing but the death
of the king of Spain can give occasion to pay attention to all this.
But, I have the honour to repeat to your Majesty, if that prince should
die, and the heads of this people should be turned respecting Cadiz and
the West Indies, believe, Sire, that they will venture again upon war;
and in truth, when I see the embarrassment which the king of England beings
to experience, and which they will indubitably increase, if peace continues,
I confess that I believe that we must be extremely on our guard lest this
prince should intend, at the bottom of his heart, to engage again in war,
endeavouring to persuade the Dutch that he does not at all desire it, and
that he has tried every expedient to preserve peace.
In the present state
of things the first orders of your Majesty will enable you to judge of
the sincerity of his sentiments with respect to the proposed treaty.
A Committee of the
House of Commons is preparing an address to tell the King that his orders
have been ill followed, with respect to the troops which have been disbanded,
and that the soldiers have been dismissed without clothes and without money,
and that he shall be pleased to mention those who were charged with the
execution of his orders.
I cannot conclude
what concerns the Parliament without having the honour to tell your Majesty
of an affair which has passed in the House of Commons, which appears to
me very pleasant. Some time ago some persons said that the votes
of the Parliament were printed; that thus they were rendered public; and
that this was a great inconvenience. They were going to resolve on
suppressing them, when Sir Christopher Musgrave, who is of the party opposed
to the Court, rose and said, that for his part he was of opinion that they
should continue to print them, in order that the members of the House might
know what passed.
They are now engaged
in forming the household of the Duke of Gloucester. It is believed
that the Earl of Marlborough will be governor of the Prince. He was
on bad terms with the King, but he has been reconciled with him for these
four months.
I know that Mr. Montague,
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, said to one of his friends that, in case
of the death of the king of Spain, they would not be taken by surprise;
that they could equip twenty ships of the line, and the Dutch as many more,
in less than three weeks to be able to provide for their interests.
On this I caused my scout at the Admiralty to be questioned, who told me
that in a month they could equip even thirty ships, besides those which
are ready to said.
LOUIS XIV. TO COUNT TALLARD
Source: Paul Grimblot, Letters of William III. And Louis XIV. and of their Ministers; Illustrative of the Domestic and Foreign Politics of England from the Peace of Ryswick to the Accession of Phillip V. of Spain: 1697 to 1700 (London, 1848). Text entered by Anthony Perry.
Versailles, May 29. 1698
The letter which you
wrote to me on the 22nd of this month informs me of what passed at the
private audience which you had with the king of England. The account
which you give me may be divided into principal heads.
I see by the first,
that the prince is no longer restrained by the pain which he had expressed
of treating for the partition of the Spanish monarchy during the life of
his Catholic Majesty. I was fully persuaded that the good reasons
which you had to produce on that subject would easily remove the obstacle.
The second article
regards the measures which the king of England thinks himself obliged towards
the Emperor, and the opinions which he entertains that he cannot dispense
with communicating to him the treaty at hand, when matters shall be so
far advanced that a speedy conclusion may be hoped for. There is
reason to believe that, when matters shall be in this state, the king of
England will himself perceive how dangerous it would be to their success
to communicate the project to the Emperor. It is sufficiently apart
that his views are not for a partition of the Spanish monarchy; that he
pretends to the whole united. If the scheme of the partition were
communicated to him, it can scarcely be doubted that he would make use
of this knowledge to oblige the king of Spain to prevent this dismemberment
of the monarchy, by sending for the Archduke of Madrid, and declaring him
his successor.
The hatred which the
Spaniards now entertain for the Germans would not hinder them from approving
in this case the resolution of his Catholic Majesty, and the whole nation,
jealous of entertaining so many states dependent on that crown, would unanimously
concur in the choice of the Archduke, rather than see them transferred
to other powers. This would be the probable effect of the communication
which might be made of the project of the Emperor, during the life of the
king of Spain; by securing to the Archduke the entire possession of that
monarchy, the war, which it is mean to avoid, would become necessary, to
prevent and maintain the rights of the legitimate hairs. I do not
doubt that the king of England will duly reflect on this point.
As for secrecy, it
is well known that he can cause resolutions to be adopted in Holland without
fearing that they would be revealed. But this is not the difficulty
which we have yet to contend, and the principal turns, at present, upon
the alternatives.
What the king of England
had said to you on the subject forms the third article of your letter.
I see that, on his part he has not made any changes in the last proposals
of which you have given me an account; the only important remark to be
made is; that he is persuaded that the interests of the English and the
Dutch do not permit them to consent to leave the low Countries in the hands
of the Emperor. This is confessing that it suits them far less to
let him unite all the dominions of the Spanish monarchy in his hands; and
consequently, that there is nothing more comfortable to their interest
than to take what those measures shall be, since the king of England perceives
inconveniences which affirms to be insurmountable in the proposals which
I have made, and I do not find any equality in the alternatives which he
has made.
To reconcile my sentiments
and his I have made a new project. I have always followed the same
principle of forming two alternatives, my only view being to propose what
appears to me to be the best calculated to preserve the peace of Europe,
and, at the same time, to indemnify, as far as possible, the legitimate
heirs, for the just claims which they sacrifice to this sole consideration.
I even leave to the king of England the choice of these alternatives.
He will decide in favour of that which he shall believe to be most comfortable
to the interests of the English and the Dutch, and, consequently, that
which will most promote the conclusion of the treaty.
By the first of these
alternatives of my grandsons would have Spain, the Indies, the islands,
countries, and places which belong at present to that monarchy, with the
exception of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily, and Milan, which the Archduke
would
have for his share, on the condition that they should never be united to
the Imperial crown; the Low Countries, in the state in which they now are,
would be ceded to the electoral prince of Bavaria. Though England
and Holland cannot pretend to have any claim to share this partition, I
would nevertheless consent, out of regard to the king of England, to leave
those two nations, by this first alternative, Cueta and Oran, for the security
of their commerce.
Lastly, whatever reasons
there may be for the preserving of the crown of Spain all that it now possesses
in the Indies, without detaching from it the smallest portion, you may
add this alternative, that I would consent that the English and the Dutch
should become masters of that part of the Island of St. Domingo which belongs
to Spain. Jamaica, which the English already possess, added to this
part of the Island of St. Domingo, would give them a very considerable
establishment in the West Indies; would secure their commerce; and other
nations would not so much fear to see theirs interrupted, as they would
do if the port of the Havannah were in the hands of the English and the
Dutch.
As for the trade of
the Mediterranean, I do not see what these two nations would have to fear.
Cueta and Oran secure them the entrance; the kingdom of Naples and Sicily
would by this alternative, be in the hands of the Archduke. The English
and the Dutch do not fear the power which that prince would possess by
sea, and all the ports of those two kingdoms would be open to them.
One of those in the Mediterranean which would be reserved to the Spanish
monarchy cannot be given them, without rendering them absolute masters
of the liberty of commerce and navigation without their consent.
I therefore cannot make any change in what I have written to you on this
article, and I cannot believe that the king of England, when he knows my
just reasons, will insist on his demand of a port in the Mediterranean;
but if he will not give up his pretension, he might reserve to him a port,
either in the kingdom of Naples or of Sicily; the monarchy of Spain, such
as I propose it to be given to one of my grandsons, being already too much
reduced to add any new restrictions to this partition.
With respect to the
second alternative, you have already shown to the king of England that
the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with the places on the coast of Tuscany,
were too unequal a portion to indemnify my son for his legitimate right
to the whole Spanish succession. I consider the cession of these
kingdoms as a continued source of embarrassment; it cost France but dear
to preserve them, and experience proves the indispensable necessity of
always maintaining troops there, of continually sending men to war, and
also, how vain all these efforts proved. I therefore do not make
a demand of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily in this second part of the
alternative.
On the basis you will
propose that the electoral prince of Bavaria shall have the kingdom of
Spain, and all that depends at present on that monarchy, with the reserve
of what is continued in the following exceptions, viz.: the kingdom of
Navarre, the towns of Fontarabia, and St. Sebastian, and the duchy of Luxemburg,
which should be given to Dauphin; the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and
Milan, to the Archduke.
It appears to me that
the rights of my son cannot be reduced to smaller demands. I was
contented with stipulating for him the restitution of a kingdom which ought
to belong to me, which the Spaniards have always unjustly retained, and
which the kings my predecessors have never ceded. I require the duchy
of Luxemburg only for the security of my frontiers. Lastly, at the
same time that I thus limit the just claims of my son, I consent that the
Archduke shall enjoy the greater part of Italy, and may perhaps, soon become
master of it, from the situation of the states which he will possess in
it.
But if the king of
England should still make the same difficulties on the cession of the duchy
of Luxemburg, I consent that you shall propose to him a new alternative.
The electoral prince of Bavaria should have the monarchy of Spain, and
what now depends upon it, with the exception of my son, with Milan, Final,
and the places on the coast of Tuscany; the Archduke should have the kingdoms
of Naples and Sicily.
By this last alternative,
I ask nothing which can cause the slightest jealousy to England and Holland.
The power of the Archduke would be an object of less suspicion to Italy,
and yet a considerable share would be left to him. Of all these alternatives
I should prefer that which shall be judged the best calculated to preserve
the general tranquility.
I shall expect the
answer of the king of England of these proposals; and they must show the
desire which I have to prevent all occurrences which might interrupt the
general peace.
I shall likewise communicate
these new alternatives to the Earl of Portland.
Though all my letters
have made you sufficiently acquainted with my intentions respecting the
proposal to cede some on my fortresses in the Low Countries, to get the
first alternative accepted, I cannot, however, too often repeat to you,
that I do not mean to cede any one for any reason whatever.